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Executive Summary 
Agricultural commodity prices have undergone exceptional volatility in the past 
decade. Staple foods such as rice, wheat and corn saw their prices rally to 
unprecedented levels especially in 2008 and 2011. During these periods, social unrest 
and food riots burst in several developing countries around the world sparking the 
debate on the role of commodities financialisation in the food price formation. 
Commodity speculators were once again put in the limelight and their activities 
fingered as the culprit behind food exorbitant prices.  
 
Firm believers that speculation was the root cause of commodities’ prices surge, the 
Swiss Young Socialist Party concluded that prohibiting speculation on agricultural 
foodstuff was the easiest way to curb staple food price rallies; hence, a surefire way to 
fight hunger in the world. This conclusion led to the inception of the popular initiative 
called “No speculation on agricultural foodstuff ” that was submitted to popular vote on 
February 28th 2016 in Switzerland.  
 
Despite its good intentions, the popular initiative was refused by 59,9% of the Swiss 
electorate. Acknowledging that Swiss voters were not indifferent to food prices surges 
and food riots around the world, this work digs into the reasons that led Switzerland to 
refuse the initiative.  
 
Speculative practices on commodities have always instigated controversies. The 
literature review associates as many advantages as harms to the practice of 
speculation. Having to decide on a misty subject not clearly explained or understood 
by politicians, the Swiss electorate based their decision on other facts than their 
knowledge about the impact of speculation on food prices. 
 
Results obtained from a local survey ashows that 58.2% of the Swiss electorate 
believed speculation was a bad thing and it contributed to foodstuff price rallies. 
However, the proportion of voters who supported the initiative was inferior to 50% of 
the total electorate. Based on this fact, we assume that a significant share of voters 
who believed speculation was a bad thing did not support the initiative. Furthermore, 
we conclude that perceiving speculation as a bad thing was not a sufficient reason to 
vote in favor of the initiative.   
 
The suspicion that prohibiting speculation in Switzerland concealed headwinds to the 
Swiss commodity-trading sector represented the greatest obstacle for the initiative. 
This study found evidences that the initiative against speculation bore the brunt of the 
importance of the commodity-trading sector for Switzerland. Considering that 65% of 
surveyed voters declared to be worried about the Swiss trading sector, we can suggest 
that the Swiss electorate was well aware of the position of hundreds of commodity-
trading companies headquartered in Switzerland whom contribute with thousands of 
well-paid jobs and a significant share of the Swiss GDP.  
 
By juxtaposing voters’ opinions on speculation and their concerns about the initiative 
covert headwinds for the Swiss economy, we gathered noteworthy information 
concerning the Swiss electorate’s decision-making process. In sum, this work 
suggests that the Swiss electorate believes that a solution to fight hunger in the world 
                                                
a Survey realized in the Canton of Geneva. The results obtained in the Canton of GVA will be used as a proxy for the 
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is more complex than merely banning speculation on agricultural products. Moreover, 
Switzerland had too much at stake and the country could not afford to put one of its 
most lucrative economical sectors in jeopardy in order to engage in a battle that had 
very little chance to be won.  
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Methodology	
 
The first part of this study contextualizes the arguments that fed the debate around the 
commodities financialisation theme. Elements from the literature and the press were 
collected to compose a summary of the situation from which the initiative emerged.   
 
The second part of this work applies statistical tools on results obtained from a survey 
in order split voters into categories according with their decision-making process. 
  
The survey had 110 people from Geneva answering 4 questions about topics related 
to the popular initiative. The answers to those questions were assumed to be among 
the most influential factors in voters’ decision-making process.  
 
Sampling Criteria 
 
The criteria used to sample the survey participants were the following: 
 
• The	survey	participant	must	be	Swiss	and	eligible	to	vote	in	Switzerland	
• The	survey	participant	is	domiciled	in	Geneva	
• The	survey	participant	is	not	a	member	of	any	political	party	
• The	survey	participant	is	not	a	commodity	trader	
• The	survey	participant	is	not	a	member	of	any	NGO	
• The	 survey	 participant	 is	 not	 a	 HEG	 student	 majoring	 in	 commodities	trading		
• The	 survey	 participant	 is	 not	 a	 student	 from	 the	 Trading	 &	 Shipping	Masters	program	from	the	university	of	Geneva.		
 
Sampling Distribution of Population Proportionsb 
 
• 139.088	voters	officially	voted	on	February	28th	in	the	Canton	of	Geneva.c	
• The	 initiative	was	 refused	by	54.5%	of	 voters	 in	Geneva.	This	proportion	will	be	considered	as	the	population	proportion.	
• 110	voters	were	sampled	in	the	Canton	of	Geneva.		Considering	population	proportion	as:				 𝝅 = 𝑿𝑵	Where:				
Π	=	Population	proportion	X	=	Number	of	items	in	the	population	having	the	attribute	of	interest		N	=	Population	size	
 	
                                                
b Business Statistics, David F Groebner and al (A decision making approach, eighth edition)  
c Official result obtained from Swiss Administration https://www.admin.ch/ch/f/pore/va/20160228/can598.html  
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	And	considering	a	sample	proportion	as:		 𝒑 = 𝒙𝒏		Where:		p=	Sample	proportion		x	=	Number	of	items	in	the	sample	with	the	attribute	of	interest	n	=	Sample	size		
Then,	if	the	sample	size	is	sufficiently	large,	a	discrete	binomial	distribution	
can	be	reasonably	approximated	by	the	normal	distribution.	A	sample	size	is	
sufficiently	large	if:		 𝒏𝝅 ≥ 𝟓    𝒂𝒏𝒅    𝒏 𝟏− 𝝅 ≥ 𝟓		Given	that:		 110 0.545 ≥ 5  𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒		and		 110 1− 0.545 ≥ 5  𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒			
Then,	we	are	assuming	our	sample	“p”	to	be	approximately	normally	
distributed	with:		𝝁𝒑 = 𝝅 		  𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒓𝒅 𝒆𝒓𝒓𝒐𝒓 = 𝝈𝒑 = 𝝅 𝟏− 𝝅𝒏 		𝒔𝒂𝒎𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒆𝒓𝒓𝒐𝒓 = 𝒑− 𝝅		Therefore,	 this	 work	 uses	 normal	 distribution	 to	 test	 its	 hypothesis.	 The	sampling	 error	 calculated	 on	 the	 number	 of	 surveyed	 voters	 who	 refused	 the	initiative	 was	"𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟" = 0.527− 0.545 =  −0.18.d	This	 work	 assumes	this	 same	 value	 of	 “sampling	 error”	 throughout	 all	 calculations	 presented	 in	chapter	4.					
 	
                                                
d The value 0.527 corresponds to the proportion of sampled voters who refused the initiative. The value 
0.545 corresponds to the population proportion of voters who refused the initiative.  
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Introduction	
 
The Swiss Young Socialist Party’s initiative entitled “Stop speculation on agricultural 
foodstuff” split the opinions among political parties and the populatione. At the core of 
the debate was the role of speculation on the surge of commodity prices in the last few 
years f .  On one hand, supporters of the initiative affirmed that speculating on 
agricultural foodstuff was an immoral practice as it contributes to cause episodes of 
famine in the world. On the other hand, critics of the initiative alleged that speculation 
had nothing to do with the surge of commodity prices as it only reacts to variations of 
fundamentals.  
 
Swiss voters had to decide whether or not prohibiting speculative practices on 
agricultural foodstuff in Switzerland was the right thing to do in order to fight hunger in 
the world. Given the lack of clarity on the real role of speculation, the path to reach a 
decision was fraught with ambiguity; Swiss voters had to deal with all sorts of 
contradictory information, which made the population get to grips with distinguishing 
reality from fallacies surrounding the speculation theme. 
 
The difficulty for Swiss voters laid primarily in the nature of the role of speculation on 
commodities price formation. Assessing the real impacts of speculation on foodstuff 
prices might have been puzzling for voters. How could ordinary people decide whether 
or not speculation was a bad thing when even specialists seem to not agree on the 
subject? To make things more complicated, the literature review advances as many 
reasons to believe speculation is beneficial as it suggests it should be abolished from 
commodity markets.   
 
The second difficulty Swiss voters encountered to reach a decision had its origins in 
the privileged role the commodity-trading sector plays in Switzerland. Switzerland is 
home for hundreds of companies that use financial instruments on their day-to-day 
activities. Voters were warned by the initiative critics that prohibiting speculation in 
Switzerland could force those companies to leave the country, causing the loss of 
thousands of jobs and a significant share of the national GDP.  
 
On February 28th 2016, the Swiss electorate rejected the initiative by 59,9% of the 
votes. Switzerland is not prohibiting speculative practices on agricultural commodities. 
In light of what was at stake, what did this result mean? Did it mean that the Swiss 
electorate does not care about food price surges and starving populations? Or did it 
mean that Swiss voters do not see speculation as a bad thing? What if Swiss voters 
only voted dreading the potential dangers such initiative could cause to the country’s 
economy? These and other questions will be treated in the following chapters in order 
to understand why the Swiss electorate rejected the initiative “Stop speculation on 
agricultural foodstuff”.     
 
   
                                                
e
 See appendix 1 and 2 Original texts of the initiative in French and German  
f Official website: http://stopspeculation.ch « Game Over » 
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The	Swiss	Political	System	
 
The Swiss direct democracy and popular initiatives  
 
Switzerland has a very unique democratic system where its electorate has the power 
to launch popular initiatives, provided that a minimum of 100’000 valid signatures is 
collected among the populationg. These popular initiatives are defined and explained 
as follows in the official Swiss authorities website h : “Any member of the Swiss 
electorate can launch a popular initiative to demand an amendment to the Federal 
Constitution (of one or more articles or paragraphs). If the initiative is successful and is 
not subsequently retracted, the amendment to the Constitution will be put to the 
popular vote and needs to be approved by a majority of the electorate and the cantons 
(a ‘double majority’) in order to be made.” 
 
Steps to launch a popular initiative in Switzerlandi 
 
The first step to launch a popular initiative is to form an initiative committee composed 
of a minimum of 7 and a maximum of 27 persons entitled to vote in Switzerland. This 
committee is responsible for drawing the text of the initiative that will be submitted to 
the Federal Chancellery.  
 
The Federal Chancellery must certify that the text and the title of the initiative 
submitted by the committee comply with national legal requirements. The Federal 
Chancellery then publishes its decision in the Federal Gazette. From the date of 
publication in the Federal Gazette, the initiative committee has 18 months to collect a 
minimum of 100’00 valid signatures.  
 
If sufficient amount of valid signatures is presented in due time to the Federal 
Chancellery, the text of the initiative is submitted to the Federal Council and the 
Parliament. At this stage the text of the initiative can be accepted, rejected or have a 
counter-proposal submitted by the Parliament. If the text of the initiative is not 
retracted, it is submitted to a popular vote.  
  
                                                
g See The Swiss democracy system: http://direct-democracy.geschichte-schweiz.ch 
h See How to launch a popular initiative in Switzerland: https://www.ch.ch/en/popular-initiatives/ 
i Text partially summarized from « How to launch an initiative » found on: https://www.ch.ch/en/popular-initiatives/    
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Chapter 1 
1.1	The	general	situation	
 
The world can be proud of its level of food production achieved over the past 60 years. 
Thanks to the Green Revolutionj, today’s level of agricultural production is sufficient to 
discredit Malthusian predictions concerning the future of humanity. As we can see on 
figure 1, today’s grain production is about 4 times superior to production levels 
reached in the 50’s.  
 
Figure 1: World Grain Production, 1950- 2012 
 
Source: Earth Policy Institute, USDA 
 
Unfortunately, despite this phenomenal increase in food production and a reduction of 
the total number of people suffering from undernourishment, hunger is still a reality for 
more than 800 million people in the world. According to World Food Program (WFP)k: “ 
Hunger and malnutrition are in fact the number one risk to health worldwide – greater 
than AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis combined” 
 
Figure 2: The changing distribution of hunger in the world 
 
 
Source: FAO 
                                                
j See Prabhu L. Pingali (2012), Green Revolution: Impacts, limits and the path ahead. 
k https://www.wfp.org/hunger  
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1.2	Food	high	prices	
 
As of 2003 the world witnessed a progressive increase of food prices, which reached 
record levels in 2008 and 2011. The FAO food price index more than doubled between 
2003 and 2008 causing the outbreak of several food riots around the world between 
2007 and 2008. Despite the plunge observed during the financial crisis, food prices 
restarted to surge as of 2010. In 2011 food prices had exceeded price levels attained 
in 2008 sparkling new episodes of food riots in the world.    
 
Figure 3: Food Price Index 
 
 
Source: FAO (image from Financial Times)  
1.3	The	commodities	market	financialisation	
 
The interest for commodities derivatives by the financial markets has significantly 
increased since 2001. Attracted by the diversification offered to their orthodox equity 
investments and potential higher returns, investors have flown into the derivative 
market especially from 2004l.  As we can see on Figure 4, the notional amount of 
outstanding futures contracts grew more than fourfold between 2001 and 2007. In an 
article written by Parantap Basu and William T Gavin about the growth of commodities 
derivatives, we can read: “ During the past decade, many institutional portfolio 
managers added commodity derivatives as an asset class to their portfolios…”  
 
The commodity financialisation phenomenon observed since 2001 has altered the 
hedgers/speculatorsm ratio, which caused the number of speculators to excessively 
outstrip the number of hedgers in the futures marketn. The consequences of this 
phenomenon is summarized as follows by Michael Greeberger, University of 
Marylando: “When speculators make up a too large share of the futures market… 
prices do not reflect market fundamentals”.  
                                                
l See Parantap Basu and William T Gavin, « What explain the growth in commodity derivatives » PDF available at: 
https://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/11/01/37-48Basu.pdf 
m The difference between hedgers and speculators is explained in chapter 3. 
n See The hunger-makers. How the Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs and other financial institutions are speculating 
with food at the expense of the poorest?  PDF available at: 
https://www.foodwatch.org/uploads/media/the_hungermakers_foodwatch_report_20111000.pdf  
o Greenberger, Michael (University of Maryland) (2010): The Relationship of Unregulated Excessive Speculation to Oil 
Market Price Volatility 
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Figure 4: Notional amounts of outstanding contracts 
 
Note: The values indicated on the y-axis are expressed in $bn. The 2015 outstanding 
notional amount was $493 trillion.  Source: Bank for international Settlement. 
 
On a research report written by Michel W Masters and Adam K White entitled: “How 
institutional investors are driving up food and energy prices?” the authors explain that 
prices reflect supply and demand realities only when physical hedgers are 
predominant on the commodity futures market. The authors also emphasize that in 
situations where speculators are dominant over hedgers, prices can become unrelated 
to fundamentals and reach irrational heights.  
 
Figure 5: Speculators VS Hedgers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The hunger makers – Foodwatch report 2011 
 
Figure 5 shows evidences that the over financialisation phenomenon was mainly 
caused by the arrival of new speculators in the market. As we can see, the percentage 
of speculators jumped from 29.5% to 74.9% in ten years, reducing the percentage of 
hedgers from 70.5% to 25.1% during the same period. The introduction of index funds 
in the futures market highly contributed to the increase of the number of speculators 
vis-à-vis the number of hedgers. Notably, Index funds, which were inexistent in 1998, 
represented 32,6% of total Futures Market participants ten year later.  
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1.4	From	correlation	to	causation	
 
By juxtaposing the evident increase of the number of speculators in the Futures Market 
over the last 10 years and the food index prices evolution observed during the same 
period, number of specialists saw a correlation between these two phenomena. This 
apparent correlation between higher food prices and the increase of the number of 
speculators in the Futures Market built ground for leftwing parties to structure their 
speech against traders and speculative practices.  
 
In Switzerland, the Swiss Young Socialist Party took a step further and attributed an 
undisputable causation link between the two phenomena conjunction described above. 
For these leftwing politicians, speculators drive prices up because they greedily want 
to profit no matter who is losing on the other side of the trade. From this rationale, an 
over simplified solution to fight hunger in the world saw the day among the inceptors of 
the initiative; If Switzerland, one of the most important commodity trading hubs in the 
world, forbids speculation on agricultural foodstuff, food prices will get back to lower 
levels, as speculators will not be able to artificially inflate them.     
1.5	The	appealing	traits	of	the	initiative		
1.5.1	Noble	cause		
 
The first appealing trait of the initiative was the fact that it was presented to the 
population as a surefire way to combat hunger in the world. It is common sense that 
every single citizen in Switzerland would like to see hunger eradicated from the world. 
Therefore, at first glance everyone was lured to think that validating the initiative was a 
no-brainer.  
1.5.2	The	word	speculation	
 
Another strong appealing trait of the initiative was the strategic use of the word 
speculation. As it will be further discussed in this paper, the word speculation conveys 
a bad image of its functions among non-initiated people. Knowing this fact, the Young 
Socialist Party decided to darken the negative aspects of speculation during the 
campaignp.   
1.5.3	Social	justice	and	morality	
 
During the campaign the defendants of the initiative stressed the fact that the Swiss 
population was fortunate to be exempt of hunger. This luck not being shared by other 
populations in the world, Switzerland should not permit its traders to play with food 
prices. The socialist party tried to create an image of immoral greedy traders getting 
richer by gambling on food prices to encourage voters to base their decision on their 
conception of morality q,r. This strategy paid off, as most of voters who were willing to 
accept the initiative were basing their decision on their sentiment of injustice and 
unfairness. s  In other words, people saying “yes” to the initiative, were in fact 
                                                
p http://www.popvaud.ch/site/?p=2395  
q https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4ybJdb0-LYU  
r https://www.swissaid.ch/fr/stop-speculation-nourriture  
s See Chapter 4 
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condemning traders that were supposedly playing with food prices while the poorest 
populations were bearing the consequences.  
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CHAPTER 2 
2.1	The	reality	is	not	as	straightforward	
 
The question whether or not speculation is responsible for commodity price hikes is 
complex. Even if on one side of the spectrum we have Paul Krugmant, Noble Prize of 
economy, depicting a guiltless image of speculation: “ futures contracts is a bet about 
the future price. It has no, zero, nada direct effect on the spot market”; affirmations 
such as George Soros’ blur the scenes: “Speculators create the bubble that lies above 
everything. Their expectations, [their] gambling on futures help drive up prices, and 
their business distorts prices, which is especially true for commodities. It is like 
hoarding food in the midst of a famine, only to make profits on rising prices. That 
should not be possible.”  
 
In the middle of such contradictory opinions, most authors and researchers agree that 
the role of speculation in the surge of commodity prices is not as straightforward as 
some may pretend. The consensus attributes a more nuanced view of speculation 
than labeling it as sole culprit or total innocent. The nuance between Krugman and 
Soros’ viewpoints is summarized by FAOu: “Financial firms are progressively investing 
in commodity derivatives as a portfolio hedge since returns in the commodity sector 
seem uncorrelated with returns to other assets. While this ‘financialisation of 
commodities’ is generally not viewed as the source of price turbulence, evidence 
suggests that trading in futures markets may have amplified volatility in the short term.”  
Assuming a more nuanced view of speculation than the ones proposed by Krugman 
and Soros and admitting that speculation alone cannot cause as much price volatility 
without changes in fundamentals, what changes in fundamentals could have 
contributed to the surge of agricultural commodity prices to levels witnessed in 
2007/08 and 2011? 
2.2	Chinese	new	meat	consumption	impacting	grains’	supply	
and	demand	
The remarkable economic ascension experienced by China in the last decades has 
significantly transformed the Chinese population consumption patterns. The Chinese 
economic boom has created a new middle class with higher income levels, which 
contributed to an alteration of food consumption behavior in the country.v In a report 
released on October 2015, PwC writes: “It has become increasingly apparent that a 
                                                
t See Speculative nonsense, once again (the conscience of a liberal) 
http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/06/23/speculative-nonsense-once-again/  
u See United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) (2010). Price Volatility in Agricultural Markets. 
Economic and Social Perspectives Policy Brief 12. PDF available at: 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/013/am053e/am053e00.pdf  
v See China growing appetite for meats, National Grain & Oil Information Center. PDF available at : 
http://unitedsoybean.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/ChinaMeatMulticlientStudyReport.pdf  
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more affluent and more urbanized China is experiencing a dramatic increase in the 
consumption of food – specifically meat.”  
Chinese people have virtually doubled their meat consumption over the last 20 yearsw. 
Although this fact might appear trifling, we can only understand the magnitude of such 
change if we put this information into perspective. The Chinese population is the 
largest population in the world with 1.3bn inhabitantsx. Considering that it takes 2 kilos 
of feed to produce 1 kilo of chicken, 3 kilos of feed to produce 1 kilo of pork and 
between 5 to 20 kilos of feed to produce 1 kilo of beefy; the new Chinese meat 
consumption represents an increase in demand of millions of tons of cereal for China. 
 
Figure 6: Chinese annual per capita meat consumption 
 
Source: FAOSTAT online 
 
Meat production being feed intensive z; the new Chinese meat consumption had 
immediate consequences on the country’s grain import/export balance. Figure 7 shows 
how the Chinese soybeans imports ramped from 2000 following the increase of meat 
consumption in the country shown on Figure 6.  
 
Figure 7: Chinese Soybeans Imports & Exports 
 
Source FAOSTAT online 
 
                                                
w See PwC report : China agricultural challenges roads to be traveled October 2015 
x UN data 2016 
y The Economist online version : December 2013 http://www.economist.com/blogs/feastandfamine/2013/12/livestock  
z See Tara Garnett, FCRN Briefing paper  January 2010, « Livestock, feed and food security » 
http://www.fcrn.org.uk/sites/default/files/FCRN_livestockfeed_foodsecurity.pdf  
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2.3.	Bad	weather	conditions	reducing	crops	around	the	world	
 
Poor weather conditions have a major influence on the levels of crops, which dictates 
the levels of stocks and supply. Unpredicted changes in weather are prone to 
decrease harvests’ output, which decreases supply and leads to shortages. During the 
periods 2006-2008 and 2010-2012, the world faced several episodes of extreme 
weather conditions that have damaged crops in major staple food producing countries.  
 
Below follows a non-exhaustive list of weather hazards episodes that took place 
between the periods 2006/2008 and 2010/2012 negatively affecting global supply of 
major agricultural products. 
 
• Australia produces 3% of the global wheat production, but the country is 
responsible to 10%-15% of the annual wheat global trade according to a PwC 
2011 reportaa. During the 2006/2007 harvests, due to a prolonged drought, 
Australia saw its wheat production fall by 57% relative to the previous cyclebb. 
As a direct result of the poor 2006/2007 wheat harvests, Australia had its wheat 
exports considerably reduced until 2008cc.  
 
• The Black Sea region is endowed with 3 major wheat producers namely 
Russia, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. Today, these 3 countries are respectively 
responsible for 25%, 18% and 22% of the global wheat productiondd. But during 
2006/08 and 2010/11 after two episodes of atypical drought leading to reduced 
harvests, these countries implemented exports’ quotas, taxes and bans in 
order to protect domestic supply. In 2008, during the world food-crisis, wheat 
exports were banned in Kazakhstan, Russian wheat exports were taxed up to 
40% and Ukraine had implemented quotas reducing considerably its exportsee.    
 
• The US is the largest corn producer and exporter in the worldff. The country 
accounts for 36% of the world’s total corn production and 40% of the world’s 
total exportsgg. In summer 2012 the nation was hit by one of the most severe 
droughts in 50 years wreak-havocking crops all over the countryhh. Corn was 
particularly hit by the drought, which resulted in a crop 12,7% inferior to the 
previous year ii.   
                                                
aa See The Australian grain industry. PwC report available at : 
http://www.pwc.com.au/industry/agribusiness/assets/australian-grains-industry-nov11.pdf  
bb http://www.indexmundi.com/agriculture/?country=au&commodity=wheat&graph=production  
cc Ibid. 
dd See The competitive position of the Black Sea Region in world wheat exports markets, by Daniel M. O’Brien and 
Frayne Olson. PDF available at : http://www.farmdoc.illinois.edu/nccc134/conf_2014/pdf/OBrien_Olson_NCCC-
134_2014.pdf  
ee See Transition to Agricultural Market Economies, The future of Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Russia by Andrew Schmitz 
and William H. Meyers  
 
ff See World of corn 2015 NCGA http://www.worldofcorn.com/pdf/WOC-2015.pdf  
gg See Why the export market is important for US corn, Minnesota department of agriculture. PDF available at : 
https://www.mda.state.mn.us/food/business/~/media/Files/food/business/economics/exports-corn.ashx  
hh See online version Financial Times, World braced for new food crisis : https://next.ft.com/content/9989dc80-d1c5-
11e1-badb-00144feabdc0  
ii World of corn, US corn production : http://www.ncga.com/upload/files/documents/pdf/woc-2014.pdf  
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Ronald Trostle (2008) has detailed several examples of protective policy measures 
taken in 2007 leading to global supply restrictions and potentially contributing to food 
prices increasejj:  
 
• China eliminates rebates on VAT on grains’ exports. These rebates used to be 
used as exports subsidies.  
• China imposes taxes on grain exports.  
• Argentina raises export taxes on wheat, corn and soybeans and restricts 
exports’ volumes of wheat.  
• Russia and Kazakhstan raise export taxes on wheat.  
•  Ukraine, Serbia and India ban wheat exports.  
• Egypt, Vietnam, Cambodia and Indonesia ban rice exports.  
• India banned the exports of all varieties of rice except basmati  
2.4	Biofuels		
 
Regulations don’t necessarily need to be restrictive in order to have a significant 
impact on the supply of certain commodities. In 2005 the American Congress adopted 
the Renewable Fuel Standards (RFS) implying a Government mandate to blend 4 
billion gallons of corn-based ethanol to gasoline by 2006 and 7.5 billion gallons by 
2012. As a result of this mandate, by 2012 around 29% of the total American corn 
production was used to produce biofuelskk.  
 
As previously mentioned, in 2012 US were severely hit by a heat wave, which 
damaged a significant portion of the American corn crop. Figure 8 shows what 
happened to the American corn exports in 2012 resulting from the compound effects of 
a severe drought and the biofuels mandate. As we can see, the American corn exports 
were reduced by more than 50% from 2011 to 2012.  
 
Figure 8: US Corn Exports 1993-2013 
 
Source: World of Corn 2014 NCGA 
 
 
                                                
jj Examples taken from Ronald Trostle, “Global Agricultural Supply and Demand: Factors Contributing to the Recent 
Increase in Food Commodity Prices”. PDF available at: http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/218027/wrs0801_1_.pdf   
kk  American Environment Protection Agency; RFS program : https://www.epa.gov/renewable-fuel-standard-
program/program-overview-renewable-fuel-standard-program  
Why did the Swiss Young Socialist’s initiative against speculation on agricultural products fail to be approved in 
Switzerland? How did the Swiss electorate reach a decision? 
Vitor Kinji MATSUURA  
14 
2.5	Food	price	formation	is	complex	
All the elements presented above such as energy prices, weather conditions and 
political decisions add up to the complexity of food prices formation. Agricultural food 
prices are the compound result of the interaction of several stimuli from the market. 
The Center for European Policy Studies (CEPS) distinguishes 5 families of 
commodities price formation drivers as shown on figure 9. As we can see, speculation 
is only one factor among dozens of others potentially contributing to commodity prices 
formation. 
Figure 9: Key Commodities Price Formation Drivers 
 
Source: Center for European Policy Studies (CEPS) 
2.6	Surging	prices	did	not	last	
 
A strong argument against the claims, which attribute food rising prices to the 
presence of speculators in the commodity market, is the fact that despite its 2 peaks in 
2008 and 2011, food index prices sharply plummeted in 2009 and have been 
consistently declining since 2011. See figure 3 
 
In the same manner anti speculators use the 2 peaks (2008 and 2011) in the food 
index prices chart to condemn the negative impacts of speculation, speculation 
defenders use the very same chart to underpin their case that these 2 peaks were the 
result of a sharp shift in the equilibrium of fundamentals, as today the speculation 
activity on agricultural foodstuff is still important, yet prices are falling.        
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CHAPTER 3 
3.1	Commodities	trading	in	Switzerland	
Although Switzerland is a small landlocked country, poorly endowed with natural 
resources and arable lands, the country has become one of the most important 
commodity trading hubs in the worldll. In recent years, a cluster of more than 500 
commodity trading companies has gathered around the Lake of Geneva, Zug and 
Lugano, creating over 10’000 jobsmm. Today the sector is responsible for 3.6%nn of the 
national GDP, which places commodity trading among the country’s most important 
economic sectors. 
Switzerland has indisputably the largest market share among other commodity trading 
centers. As shown on figure 10, Switzerland is a major trader of grains, oil and metals, 
which places the country ahead of other important centers such as London and 
Singapore. The country is also the world’s biggest trader of sugar and coffee, being 
responsible for respectively 50% and 60% of the world’s transactions. 
Figure 10: Switzerland’s commodity trading market share 
 
Source: SWI swissinfo.ch 
                                                
ll See Switzerland and the commodities trade, Swiss academies factsheet. Pdf available 
at: https://www.google.ch/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=0ahUKEwiEqoq70JLMAhWLPhQKHcx9
DWAQFggjMAE&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.naturalsciences.ch%2Fdownload%2F4976ba22-e34b-52a5-ad43-
5d4b4c594903%2F40408&usg=AFQjCNHAOeL-G_TPeraBjkEZ1Whnradzmw&bvm=bv.119745492,d.d24  
mm See Switzerland as commodity trading center, Swiss Banking Factual Pdf available at: 
http://www.zugcommodity.ch/media/documents/upload/SBA_Switzerland%20as%20a%20commodity%20trading%20ce
ntre.pdf    
nn Ibid. 
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3.2	Why	Switzerland?	
The Swiss Trading/Shipping Association (STSA) alleges that there are other reasons 
than tax purposes contributing for Switzerland becoming such an important commodity 
trading center. Among these reasons STSA cites: 
• The Swiss political stability: Switzerland is well known for its traditional political 
stability and its neutrality, which comforts investors and stakeholders.  
• Financial expertise: Before being a commodity-trading hub, Switzerland is a 
notorious financial center. The availability of world-class financial instruments 
providers combined with the security of its banking system has immensely 
contributed to attract international trading companies to the Swiss soil. 
• Time zone: The geographic localization of Switzerland is an important factor 
attracting traders to the country.  Situated in the middle of Europe, Switzerland 
benefits from an ideal time zone, which enables traders to follow Asian 
transactions in the morning and American transactions in the afternoon.    
• Abundance of qualified professionals: Switzerland benefits from an abundant 
qualified labor pool. The country counts numerous applied-science schools 
delivering skilled professionals to the market. The multicultural facet of the 
country also contributes to the plentiful availability of bilingual/trilingual 
professionals, which facilitates trading.   
3.3	How	commodity	trading	companies	function?	Defining	
trading	arbitrages	
Commodity trading companies are essentially firms that add value by physically 
moving commodities from places where they are abundant to places where they are 
scarceoo. Commodity traders like to say that their main role is to balance the resources 
imbalances in the world. But behind this rather simplistic definition hides a complex 
universe composed of robust supply chain knowledge, cutting edge logistics and 
financial expertisepp.  
A crucial element necessary to understand how commodity trading companies function 
is the clarification of the concept of arbitrage. The term arbitrage used by commodity 
trading firms (CTFs) has a different definition from the definition used in financeqq. 
Craig Pirrong (2014) says about arbitrage: “An arbitrage is said to exist when the value 
of a transformation, as indicated by the difference between the prices of the 
transformed and untransformed commodity, exceeds the cost of making the 
transformation.”  
Arbitrage can be understood as an opportunity to profit from the difference of levels of 
availability of a certain commodity in 2 different places. These opportunities can 
emerge in 3 different ways: in space, time and formrr. The role of CTFs is to identify 
                                                
oo See Craig Pirrong, The economics of commodity trading firms. Pdf available at : 
http://eurocapitalmarkets.org/system/files/Report_TheEconomicsCommodityTradingFirms.pdf  
pp See Craig Pirrong The economics of commodity trading firms. Pdf available at : 
http://www.trafigura.com/media/1364/economics-commodity-trading-firms.pdf  
qq Ibid. 
rr Ibid. 
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these opportunities and put together a strategy based on their supply chain 
knowledge, logistics and financial expertise to perform such transformationsss.  
3.3.1	Space	arbitrage	
A transformation in space means that the trader has identified a place Alpha, where a 
certain commodity is abundant and a place Beta where this same commodity is 
scarce. Knowing that this commodity is cheaper in Alpha, traders arrange its transfer 
to Beta and make a profit on the transaction. Example: Traders buy wheat from 
Ukraine, one of the most important wheat producers in the world, to sell it to Egypt, 
one of the biggest wheat importers in the world.  
3.3.2	Time	arbitrage	
A transformation in time happens when traders identify a period of the year when a 
certain type of commodity gains or loses value. Commodities tend to have their prices 
varying all year long but sometimes these variations are predictable such as the 
decrease in prices of agricultural products immediately after harvests. Example: 
Traders may choose to buy corn from a producer right after the harvest season when 
corn prices are lower, store it for a few months and finally resell it for a higher price to 
a livestock feeder when corn supply gets smaller.  
3.3.3	Form	arbitrage	
The last type of transformation occurs when there is a form arbitrage.  
Transformations in form occur when traders identify commodities that, in their current 
form, do not satisfy the local demand requirements. In order to meet the local demand 
requirements traders transform the quality of the commodity by blending it with a 
commodity of a different quality.  Example: Traders commonly blend different grades 
of oil from different origins in order to meet refineries requirements.  
In order to successfully perform those transformations, CTFs have become specialized 
in supply chain and risk management. CTFs use their advanced knowledge of the 
market to profit from the best trading flows, the cheapest ways of shipping and the best 
locations for storage. As supply chain managers, these companies know the best 
moments to buy, sell and store. As risk managers, CTFs know how to protect 
themselves against prices moves, counterparty risks and various other hazards.  
3.4	Hedging	VS	Speculation	
It is not in the scope of this paper to explain how hedging works and what are the 
hedging strategies used by CTFs to avoid unfavorable price moves against their 
positions. Therefore, the sole objective of this section is to distinguish speculative 
practices from hedging practices.  
At this stage it is important to clarify that CTFs are not speculators per sett. As 
explained in the previous section, the main role of CTFs is to identify possible 
                                                
ss Ibid. 
tt Ibid. 
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arbitrages and use their knowledge in supply chain, logistics and risk management in 
order to successfully operate space, time and form transformations.  
Although physical traders (CTFs) are not initially buying and selling commodities 
speculating on their price moves, these traders are exposed to price volatility from the 
moment they purchase a commodity until the moment they sell it. Knowing that the 
commodity-trading sector generates very small margins, the slightest unfavorable price 
move against a trader position is able of ruin the trade profitability. In order to protect 
trades against unfavorable price movements between the purchase and the sales 
moment, traders use financial instruments such as futures contracts and options. This 
practice of using financial operations in order to manage price risk is called hedging. 
Speculators on the other hand also use futures contracts. But contrary to hedgers, 
speculators use this type of financial instruments to generate profits by betting on the 
direction prices will move. The international trading center (ITC) clarifies the difference 
between hedging and speculation with the following words: “where hedging is 
essentially a means to avoid or reduce price risk, speculation relies on the risk 
element… hedging offers an element of protection against price risk, whereas 
speculation involves deliberately taking a risk on price movements, up or down, in the 
hope of obtaining a profit…”uu 
As hedgers and speculators pursue different goals when buying or selling futures 
contracts, they also have opposing positions in the futures market. Actually, 
transactions in the futures market are only possible because of this fundamental 
difference. When hedgers want to sell futures contract to protect themselves against 
prices going down, most of the times these contracts are bought by speculators betting 
that prices are going up. Hedgers’ and speculators’ interests on the Futures Market is 
summarized as follows by the ITC: “One of the principles of speculation involves the 
opportunity for gain that the investor achieves by agreeing to accept some of the risk 
passed off by the hedger. In other words, the hedger gives up some opportunity in 
exchange for reduced risk. The speculator on the other hand acquires opportunity in 
exchange for taking on risk.”vv  
  
                                                
uu See ITC website: Difference between hedging and speculation http://www.intracen.org/coffee-guide/hedging-and-
other-operations/differences-between-hedging-and-speculation/  
 
 
vv Ibid. 
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CHAPTER 4 
4.1	Ballot	results	raising	questions	
After months of campaignww and public debates on national television, Swiss voters 
were finally called to deliberate on whether Switzerland should ban speculative 
practices on agricultural foodstuff. In the afternoon of February 28th 2016, the ballot’s 
final result was communicated to the public. The Swiss electorate had decided with 
59,9% of the votes that speculative practices on agricultural foodstuff should not be 
banned in Switzerland.   
Considering the leftwing party’s allegations on speculation as a vector of hunger and 
misery among the poorest populations in the world, did this result mean that 6 out of 
10 Swiss voters do not care about other populations’ woes? Was the initiative refused 
because the Swiss electorate did not believe that a ban on speculative practices in 
Switzerland could address the situation? Or was there something else?  
On the other side of the spectrum, a noteworthy 40,1% of the electorate voted in favor 
of the initiative. Bearing in mind that people’s opinion on speculation was at the core of 
the debate, did this result mean that 4 out of 10 Swiss voters saw speculation as a bad 
thing? What percentage of people who thought speculation was a bad thing actually 
voted in favor of the initiative?  
4.2	Voters	profiling	level	I  
In this section, we are going to attempt to find out possible reasons that contributed to 
the refusal of the Swiss Young Socialist’s Initiative. In order to accomplish this task, we 
are going to make a few assumptions regarding the Swiss electorate.   
Assumption 1:  Each Swiss voter prior to voting had to implicitly answer the 
questions: Is speculation really a bad thing? Is it causing prices to surge and 
thus creating episodes of hunger in the world?  
Considering assumption 1, there were 3 possible types of voters who voted on 
February 28th 2016. These voters were categorized as a function of what they thought 
about the role of speculation on the surge of agricultural foodstuff prices. 
  
                                                
ww Appendix 3 & 4: Non-exhaustive list of parties and companies supporting or opposing the initiative. 
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Figure 11: Type of voters 
 
4.2.1	Defining	categories	of	voters	level	I	(assumption	1	correlate):	
• (Y): Category of voters who thought speculation was a bad thing.  
• (N): Category of voters who thought speculation was not a bad thing.  
• (?): Category of voters who did not have an opinion regarding the role of 
speculation.  
Assumption 2: Considering assumption 1 and notwithstanding other reasons 
potentially having an influence on voters’ decisions, voters either voted “YES”, 
in favor of the initiative or “NO”, against the approval of the initiative.  
By taking assumptions 1&2 into account, we split Swiss voters into 6 categories: 
Figure 12: Voters category level I 
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4.2.2	Defining	categories	of	voters	level	II:  
• (YY): Category of voters who thought speculation was a bad thing and 
voted in favor of the initiative.  
• (YN): Category of voters who thought speculation was a bad thing but 
decided to vote against the initiative.  
• (NY): Category of voters who did not think speculation was a bad thing but 
decided to vote in favor of the initiative. 
• (NN): Category of voters who did not think speculation was a bad thing and 
voted against the initiative.  
• (?Y): Category of voters who did not know whether speculation was a bad 
thing but decided to vote in favor of the initiative.  
• (?N): Category of voters who did not know whether speculation was a bad 
thing but decided to vote against the initiative. 
4.3	Survey	part	I: 
A survey completed in Geneva after the February 28th 2016 vote had 110 people 
answering 4 questions about the initiative. The combined answers of questions 1 and 
2 presented below were used to estimate the proportions of voters fitting in each of the 
categories described above:  
• Question 1: Do you think speculation on agricultural foodstuff is a bad thing as 
it causes price surges, which contributes to exacerbate episodes of hunger in 
the world? 
• Question 2: Did you vote in favor of the Young Socialist Initiative aiming at 
banning speculative practices on agricultural products in Switzerland? 
Figure 13: Answers to question 1 (left) / Answers to question 2 (right) 
 
As we can see on the pie charts presented above, the majority of surveyed voters 
58.2% had a bad opinion about speculation. Curiously, however, only 47.3% of 
surveyed voters confirmed their conviction by validating the initiative. These 
proportions’ mismatch entails that a portion of people who believed speculation was a 
bad thing voted against the initiative. Therefore, we can assume that considering 
speculation as a bad thing was not a sufficient reason to vote in favor of the initiative.  
By adding one level of granularity to the results above, we find the following categories 
of voters and their proportions:  
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Figure 14: Voters proportions per category 
 
4.3.1	Survey	results	I:	
• 38.2% of the surveyed voters thought speculation was a bad thing and 
confirmed their position by voting in favor of the initiative. 
• As much as 20% of the surveyed voters thought speculation was a bad thing 
and did not confirm their position as they voted against the initiative. 
• Only 1.8% of the surveyed voters thought speculation was not a bad thing and 
voted in favor of the initiative. 
• 25.5% of the surveyed voters thought speculation was not a bad thing and 
confirmed their position by voting against the initiative. 
• 7.2% of the surveyed voters did not have a take on speculation but voted in 
favor of the initiative  
• 7.2% of the surveyed voters did not have a take on speculation but voted 
against the initiative. 
4.3.2	Interpretations:	
The proportion of voters belonging to the YN category seems to be one of the reasons 
why despite having 58.2% of voters against speculation, only 47.3% voted in favor of 
the initiative. Taking into consideration our assumptions, YN = 20% represents a 
significant number of surveyed voters who did not think that considering speculation as 
a bad thing was a satisfactory reason to support the initiative. Thus, we can assume 
that these voters based their decisions considering other factors than their opinion on 
the role of speculation in the episodes of hunger in the world.  
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4.3.3	YN	Voters’	Claim	
Assuming a proportion sampling error of 0.18  
Sampling error = 𝜋 − 𝑝 𝜋 = 0,218 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑝 = 0.2 
Where: 𝑝 = 0.2 Sample proportion of YN 𝜋 = 0,218  YN Population proportion assumed with sampling error.xx 
YN Voters’ Claim: The percentage of voters who thought speculation was a bad thing 
and voted against the initiative was smaller than 20%. 
Hypothesis testing: 𝐻𝑜: 𝜋 ≥ 20%  𝐻1:𝜋 < 20%  (Claim) 
Significance level α = 0.05 (left tail test) 
Decision rule: reject 𝐻𝑜 if Z score < - 1.645 (from normal distribution table) 
Z-score = 
!!!! !!!!  = !.!!!.!"#!.!"# !!!.!"#!!"  = - 0.457 
 
We do not have enough evidence to reject 𝐻𝑜. Thus, we can conclude that at least 
20% of the Swiss electorate believed speculation was a bad thing and yet voted 
against the initiative.  
                                                
xx See methodology section 
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Based on this result and considering our assumptions, we can conclude that a 
significant share of Swiss voters did not consider their bad opinion on speculation as a 
sufficient reason to validate the Young Socialist initiative.   
4.4	Voters	profiling	level	III	
Considering the answers collected in the first part of the survey and reflecting on the 
percentage of people who voted against the initiative despite their negative opinion on 
speculation, we are going to sub-categorize the surveyed voters in order to fine-tune 
their profiles.  
Assumption 3: We assume that after deciding whether or not speculation was a 
bad thing, voters had to decide whether or not they were worried about the 
Swiss trading sector in case the initiative were to be approved by the 
population.  
Assumption 4: Considering assumptions 1&3 and notwithstanding other 
reasons potentially having an influence on their decisions, voters either voted 
“YES”, in favor of the initiative or “NO”, against the initiative. 
Considering Assumptions 3&4, we can split surveyed voters into 12 sub-categories 
as follows:  
Figure 15: Voters subcategories  
 
4.4.1	Defining	sub-categories	of	voters:		
• (YYY): Subcategory of voters who thought speculation was a bad thing prone 
to cause prices of agricultural products to surge. These voters voted in favor of 
the initiative despite the fact that they were worried about the possible impacts 
of the initiative on the Swiss trading sector.   
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• (YYN): Subcategory of voters who thought speculation was a bad thing prone 
to cause prices of agricultural products to surge. These voters decided to vote 
against the initiative because they were worried about the possible impacts of 
the initiative on the Swiss trading sector.  
• (YNY): Subcategory of voters who thought speculation was a bad thing prone 
to cause prices of agricultural products to surge. These voters voted in favor of 
the initiative because they were not worried about the possible impacts of the 
initiative on the Swiss trading sector. 
• (YNN): Subcategory of voters who thought speculation was a bad thing prone 
to cause prices of agricultural products to surge. These voters voted against 
the initiative even though they were not worried about the possible 
consequences of the initiative on the Swiss trading sector.  
• (NYY): Subcategory of voters who did not think speculation was a bad thing. 
These voters decided to vote in favor of the initiative despite the fact that they 
were worried about the potential consequences the initiative could have on the 
Swiss trading sector. 
• (NYN): Subcategory of voters who did not think speculation was a bad thing. 
These voters were worried about the potential harms the initiative could cause 
to the Swiss trading sector and therefore they voted against the initiative.  
• (NNY): Subcategory of voters who did not think speculation was a bad thing 
but they voted in favor of the initiative because they were not worried about the 
possible consequences the initiative could cause to the Swiss trading sector.  
• (NNN): Subcategory of voters who did not think speculation was a bad thing. 
These voters were not worried about the consequences of the initiative on the 
Swiss trading sector, but because they believed speculation was not a bad 
thing, they voted against the initiative.  
• (?YY): Subcategory of voters who did not have a take on the concept of 
speculation. These voters voted in favor of the initiative despite the fact that 
they were worried about its consequences on the Swiss trading sector.  
• (?YN): Subcategory of voters who did not have a take on the concept of 
speculation. These voters voted against the initiative because they were 
worried about its consequences on the Swiss trading sector.  
• (?NY): Subcategory of voters who did not have a take on the concept of 
speculation. Since these voters were not worried about the consequences of 
the initiative on the Swiss trading sector, they decided to vote in favor the 
initiative 
• (?NN): Subcategory of voters who did not have a take on the concept of 
speculation. These voters were not worried about the consequences of the 
initiative on the Swiss trading sector. These voters decided to vote against the 
initiative.  
4.4.2	Survey	part	II	
The combined answers of questions 1,2 and 3 were used to estimate the proportions 
of voters fitting in each of the sub-categories described above.  
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• Question 3: Were you worried to see commodity-trading companies leaving 
Switzerland if the Swiss population had accepted the initiative? 
 
Figure 16: Answers to question 3 
 
 
 
 
As we can see on the pie chart presented above, the Swiss trading sector was a major 
concern among voters. More than 65% of surveyed voters expressed that they were 
worried about seeing commodity-trading companies leaving Switzerland for other 
countries.  
4.4.3	Worried	Voters’	Claim	
Assuming the proportion sampling error = 1.8 
Sampling error = 𝜋 − 𝑝 𝜋 = 0.668 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑝 = 0.65 
Where:  𝑝 = 0.65 Sample proportion of worried voters 𝜋 = 0.668 Population proportion of worried voters assumed with sampling error 
Worried voters Claim: Less than 65% of the Swiss electorate was worried about the 
Swiss commodity-trading sector. 
Hypothesis testing: 𝐻𝑜 ≥ 65%   𝐻1 < 65% (Claim) 
Significance level α = 0.05 (left tail test) 
Decision rule: Reject 𝐻𝑜 if Z-score ≤ - 1.645 (normal distribution table) 
Z score = 
!!!! !!!!  = !.!"!!.!!"!.!!" !!!.!!"!!"  = - 0.4008 
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We do not have enough evidence to reject 𝐻𝑜. Thus it is not statistically incorrect to 
affirm that at least 65% of the Swiss electorate was worried about the impact of the 
initiative on the Swiss commodity-trading sector.  
Assuming that the concern about the Swiss commodity sector was one of the reasons 
leading people to vote against the initiative, we sub-categorized voters in order to 
estimate the impact of this concern on voters final decisions.  
Figure 17: Voters’ percentage per subcategory  
 
4.4.4	Survey	results	II  
• 10.9% of surveyed voters decided that their negative view on speculation was 
more important than their worries concerning commodities trading companies 
leaving Switzerland. Therefore, those voters decided to vote in favor of the 
initiative.  
• 20% of the surveyed voters decided that their concerns about the Swiss 
trading sector were more important than their opinions on speculation. 
Therefore, those voters decided to vote against the initiative. 
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• 27% of the surveyed voters decided to vote in favor of the initiative because 
they had a bad opinion on speculation and because they were not worried 
about the Swiss trading sector. 
• None of the surveyed voters rejected the initiative when they had a bad 
opinion about speculation and they were not worried about the Swiss trading 
sector. 
• None of the surveyed voters accepted the initiative when they had a good 
opinion about speculation and they were worried about the Swiss trading 
sector.  
• 21.8% of the surveyed voters were totally against speculation because they 
thought speculation was not a bad thing and they were worried about the 
Swiss commodity-trading sector.  
• 1.8% of surveyed voters accepted the initiative when they did not have a bad 
opinion about speculation and they were worried about the Swiss trading 
sector.  
• 3.6% of surveyed voters rejected the initiative despite not being concerned 
about the Swiss commodity-trading sector because they did not have a bad 
opinion on speculation.  
• 7.3% of surveyed voters did not know what to think about speculation but 
finally voted in favor of the initiative despite their concerns about the Swiss 
commodity-trading sector. 
• 5.4% of surveyed voters did not know what to think about speculation but 
finally voted against the initiative as they were concerned by the Swiss 
commodity-trading sector.   
• None of the surveyed voters voted in favor of the initiative when they did not 
know what to think about speculation and when they were not worried about 
the Swiss trading sector.  
• 1.8% of surveyed voters rejected the initiative when they did not know what to 
think about speculation and when they were not worried about the Swiss 
trading sector.  
 
4.4.5	Interpretations		
YYY  
YYY = 10.9% suggests that 1 out of 10 voters composing the Swiss electorate would 
like to see Switzerland being proactive in regards to its commodity-trading sector 
regulations. Despite being concerned about the revenues and jobs that the 
commodity-trading sector represents for Switzerland, these voters think that actions 
should be taken in order to address the hunger situation in the world.  
Voters composing this subcategory often claimed that speculating on agricultural 
foodstuff was immoral and Switzerland should not be proud to make money out of a 
sector that starves millions of people around the world. This proportion of the Swiss 
electorate probably thought Switzerland was doing something immoral and therefore 
would have liked to see the country stopping its activities even though such decision 
might have implied economical risks for the country.  
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YYN  
YYN = 20%. These voters believed speculation was a bad thing yet they did not want 
to adopt any measures to ban its practices in Switzerland. Contrary to YYY, these 
voters weighed the risks involved in accepting the initiative as more important than 
their opinion about the role of speculation.  
An argument often heard from this type of voter was that an action taken in 
Switzerland was not bound to address the situation in the world. For these voters, If 
Switzerland decided to forbid speculation on agricultural products, other countries 
would have never followed suit and would probably end up taking over Switzerland’s 
market share. These voters summarize the outcome of this initiative as: Switzerland 
loses one of its most important economical sectors and the situation in the world 
remains the same.  
YNY 
YNY = 27%. This result suggests that the majority of voters who supported the Young 
Socialist Initiative were people who did not like speculative practices on agricultural 
foodstuff and were not concerned about trading companies leaving the Swiss territory.  
Voters of this subcategory were likely to be the ones claiming that Switzerland had 
nothing to lose in accepting this initiative and would soon be followed by other 
countries. In their view, Switzerland should show the way and pioneer in the action 
against speculation rather than having to comply with international regulations 
imposed on the country.  
This profile suits the inceptors of the initiative who believes speculation on agricultural 
products is living on borrowed time. If speculation on agricultural products is bound to 
disappear, Switzerland might as well get rid of its practices now and act in favor of a 
better world.  
YNN  
YNN = 0%: This result suggests that surveyed voters had no reasons to vote against 
the initiative if they believed that speculation was a bad thing and they were not 
worried about the Swiss commodity-trading sector. Therefore, this result implies that 
all of the surveyed voters, who were against speculation and did not care about the 
Swiss trading sector voted in favor of the initiative.  
NYY 
NYY = 0%: This result suggests that surveyed voters had no reasons to vote in favor 
of the initiative if they did not believe speculation was a bad thing and if they were 
worried about the Swiss trading sector. Therefore, this result implies that all surveyed 
voters, who had a positive opinion on speculation and were worried about the Swiss 
commodity-trading sector voted against the initiative.  
NYN  
NYN = 21.8%. The majority of surveyed voters who rejected the initiative had a 
positive view of speculation and was worried about the Swiss commodity-trading 
sector.   
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This subcategory suits liberal voters who defended that speculation is necessary to 
control prices volatility in the market. As part of the most aggressive critics of the 
initiative, these voters believed that Switzerland had everything to lose by accepting 
this initiative that was not going to address the situation anyways.  
The Swiss parliament had a NYN profile as it advised the population to refuse the 
initiative on the basis that speculation was a necessary instrument to protect producers 
and give liquidity to the market. The parliament also suggested that thousands of jobs 
were threaten in Switzerland if companies could not exert freely their activities.  
NNY  
NNY = 1.8%. A very small number of surveyed voters voted in favor of the initiative 
only because they were not worried about the Swiss commodity-trading sector. This 
implies that not being worried about the potential loss of jobs and revenues for the 
country was not a sufficient reason to accept the initiative. Therefore, we can conclude 
that the majority of people who accepted the initiative had a bad opinion about 
speculation at first place.  
NNN  
NNN = 3.6% Only a small number of surveyed voters voted against the initiative only 
because they did not view speculation as a bad thing. This implies that considering 
speculation a good thing was not a sufficient reason to reject the initiative. Therefore, 
we can conclude that most of voters who rejected the initiative were also worried about 
the Swiss commodity-trading sector.  
?YY 
?YY = 7.3% These voters did not know what to think about speculation and were 
nonetheless worried about the Swiss trading sector. Their decision to accept the 
initiative might have come from the feeling that Switzerland would have to get rid of 
speculative practices sooner or later. The memory of Switzerland losing its bank 
secrecy imposed by international pressure might have influenced voters of this 
subcategory.  
?YN 
?YN = 5.4% This subcategory of voters was worried about the Swiss commodity-
trading sector and probably decided to play it safe since they did not know what to 
think about speculation. These voters probably decided to vote as the Swiss 
Parliament advised the population to vote.   
?NY 
?NY = 0% None of the surveyed voters who did not know what to think about 
speculation and were not worried about the Swiss trading sector decided to approve 
the initiative.  
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?NN 
?NN = 1.8% is exactly one-third of ?YN =5.4%, which suggest that people who were in 
doubt about speculation but were worried about the Swiss trading sector rejected 3 
times more the initiative than those who had a doubt about speculation but were not 
worried about the Swiss trading sector. This result along with YYN shows the 
important role worried voters played on the final ballot results. 
4.5	Worried	voters	
Voters worried about the Swiss commodity-trading sector might have been the ballot’s 
result main deciders. As shown previously, more than 65% of surveyed voters said 
they were concerned about the Swiss trading sector. If we take a closer look at how 
worried voters voted, we can see that the majority of worried voters voted against the 
initiative, even when they did not know what to think about speculation or when they 
were convinced speculation was bad thing.  
Figure 18: Worried voters split from total voters
 
4.5.1	Worried	voters	breakdown	
The total amount of surveyed worried voters was 72. From those 72 surveyed voters, 
52 voters voted against the initiative and 20 voters voted in favor of the initiative. On 
the other side, the number of unworried surveyed voters was 38. From those 38 
unworried voters, 32 voters voted in favor of the initiative and 6 voters voted against 
the initiative. Considering that the proportion of worried who voted against the initiative 
was larger than the proportion of unworried voters who voted against the initiative, do 
we have statistical evidence to claim that worried voters tended to vote more often 
against the initiative than unworried voters? 
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Figure 19: Worried & Unworried voters breakdown 
 
Worried voters Claim number 2: Worried voters tended to vote more often against 
the initiative than unworried voters. 
Comparing 2 population proportions- Hypothesis testing: 𝐻𝑜: 𝑝1 = 𝑝2    𝐻1: 𝑝1 ≠ 𝑝2 (Claim) 
 Significance level α = 0.05 (two tails test)  
Decision rule: Reject 𝐻𝑜 if Z-score ∈ rejection zone z > 1.645 or z < -1.645 (normal 
distribution table) 
Z-score= 
!!!!! ! !!!!!!"#! !!!"#$ !!!! !!!   
Where: 𝑝1 = !!!!  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑝2 = !!!! 
Worried voters:  𝑝1 = !!!! = !"!" =  0.72 
Unworried voters: 𝑝2 = !!!! = !!" = 0.158 
Overall proportion: 𝑝𝑏𝑎𝑟 = !!!!!!!!!!!!!!  = !"∗!.!"!!"∗!.!"#!"!!"  = 0.519 
Therefore, 
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Z-score = 
!.!"!!.!"# ! !!.!"# !!!.!"# !!"! !!" = 5.6 
 
We have enough evidence to reject 𝐻𝑜. Thus we can claim that worried voters tended 
to vote more often against the initiative than unworried voters. Therefore, we can 
conclude that worried voters’ decision has been pivotal in the ballot’s results.  
4.5.2	Survey	part	III:  
The first 2 parts of the survey was composed of 3 questions aiming at finding the 
possible reasons that underpinned voters’ decisions. In the last part of the survey we 
want to know whether voters who knew about the way the Futures Market works were 
more positive about speculation vis-à-vis voters who did not know anything about the 
Futures Market.  
In order to estimate whether voters who knew something about hedging were less 
prone to have a bad opinion about speculation, we compared the results of the first 
and the fourth questions.  
• Question 1: Do you think speculation on agricultural foodstuff is a bad thing as 
it causes price surges, which contributes to exacerbate episodes of hunger in 
the world? 
• Question 4: Do you know anything about how hedging and the Futures Market 
work? 
Figure 20: Answers question 1 (left) / Answers question 4 (right) 
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As we can easily notice by looking at the pie charts above, the proportion of voters 
who did not know how hedging and the Futures Market work was largely superior to 
the proportion of voters who knew something these financial instruments.  
The charts also tell us that the proportion of voters who understood about hedging was 
approximately equivalent to the proportion of people who did not have a negative 
opinion about speculation.  
Assumption 5: Each voter prior to making his opinion about speculation 
implicitly asked himself whether he knew something about Futures Market or 
not. We assume that voters either knew something, in which case he answered, 
“YES”, or he did not know anything, in which case he answered “NO”. 
Considering assumption 5 and still assuming that voters can have a positive, a bad or 
no opinion about speculation (assumption 1), we can categorize surveyed voters as 
follows:  
Figure 21: Type of voters by opinion on speculation  
 
4.5.3	Defining	categories	of	voters:	
• (YT): Category of voters who had some knowledge about the Futures Market 
and had a negative opinion about speculation. 
• (YF): Category of voters who did not have any knowledge about the Futures 
market and had a negative opinion about speculation.  
• (NT): Category of voters who had some knowledge about the Futures market 
and had a positive opinion about speculation.  
• (NF): Category of voters who did not have any knowledge about the Futures 
Market and had a positive opinion about speculation.  
• (?T): Category of voters who had some knowledge about the Futures Market 
and did not have a firm opinion about speculation. 
• (?F): Category of voters who did not have any knowledge about the Futures 
Market and had no firm opinion about speculation.  
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4.5.4	Results:	
• 28% of the surveyed voters who had a negative opinion on speculation had 
some knowledge about hedging and the Futures Market. 
• 72% of surveyed voters who had a negative opinion on speculation had no 
knowledge about neither hedging no the Futures Market.  
• 40% of the surveyed voters who had a positive opinion on speculation had 
some knowledge about hedging and the Futures Market. 
• 60% of the surveyed voters who had a positive opinion on speculation had 
no knowledge about hedging or the Futures Market. 
• 12.5% of the surveyed voters who had no opinion about speculation had 
some knowledge about hedging and the Futures Market. 
• 87% of the surveyed voters who had no opinion about speculation had no 
knowledge about hedging or the Futures Market. 
 
Figure 22: Proportion of voters per opinion on speculation  
 
4.5.5	Knowledge	about	Futures	Market	Breakdown	
 
If we exclude voters who did not have an opinion about speculation; among all other 
surveyed voters, who either thought speculation was a bad thing or a good thing, 30 
surveyed voters knew something about the Futures Market, whereas 64 surveyed 
voters did not know anything about it. Among the 30 voters who knew something about 
the Futures Market, 18 voters had a bad opinion about speculation, whereas among 
the 64 voters who did not know anything about the Futures Market, 46 voters had a 
bad opinion about speculation. Considering that the proportion of voters who did not 
know anything about the Futures Market and had a bad opinion about speculation is 
larger than the proportions of voters who knew something about the Futures Market 
and had a bad opinion about speculation, do we have enough statistical evidence to 
affirm that people who did not know anything about the Futures Market tended to have 
more often a bad opinion about speculation than voters who knew something about 
the Futures Market?  
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Figure 23: Opinion on speculation breakdown 
 
Comparing 2 population proportionsyy 
 
Unsophisticated voters Claimzz: Voters who did not know anything about the Futures 
Market tended to have more often a bad opinion about speculation than voters who 
knew something about the Futures Market. 
 
Hypothesis testing: 𝐻𝑜: 𝑝1 = 𝑝2     𝐻1: 𝑝1 ≠ 𝑝2  (Claim) 
Significance level α = 0.05 (two tails test)  
Decision rule: Reject 𝐻𝑜 if z-score ∈ rejection zone z > 1.645 or z < -1.645 (normal 
distribution table) 
z-score= 
!!!!! ! !!!!!!"#$ !!!"#$ !!!! !!!   
Where: 𝑝1 = !!!!  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑝2 = !!!! 
Sophisticated voters:  𝑝1 = !!!! = !"!" =  0.6 
                                                
yy The proportions differ from figure 24 because the proportion of voters who did not have an opinion about 
speculation was not used in this calculations 
zz Unsophisticated voter: voter who did not know anything about speculation and had a bad opinion about 
speculation.  
Sophisticated voter: voter who knew something about speculation and had a bad opinion about speculation.  
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Unsophisticated voters: 𝑝2 = !!!! = !"!" = 0.72 
Overall proportion: 𝑝𝑏𝑎𝑟 = !!!!!!!!!!!!!!  = !"∗!.!!!"∗!.!"!"!!"  = 0.68 
Therefore, 
Z-score = !.!!!.!" ! !!.!" !!!.!" !!"! !!" = −1.162 
 
 
 
We do not have enough evidence to reject Ho. Hence; we cannot say that 
unsophisticated voters tended to have more often than sophisticated voters a bad 
opinion about speculation. Therefore, we can conclude that the final ballot result did 
not depend on whether or not voters knew something about the Futures Market.   
4.6	Final	Thoughts	
 
This survey shows evidences that one of the most influential elements in voters’ 
decision-making process seemed to be the possible impacts of the initiative on the 
Swiss commodity-trading sector.  
 
Notwithstanding the ballot’s outcome, speculation on agricultural foodstuff seems to be 
unpopular among voters. However, beyond speculation unpopularity, other elements 
at stake may have weighed more on voters’ final decisions.   Therefore, in accordance 
to all assumptions taken in this work, the main reasons that appeared to have impeded 
the Swiss Young Socialist initiative to be approved by the Swiss electorate were the 
following: 
 
• Lack of absolute and undeniable proof that speculation on agricultural foodstuff 
was the main culprit behind staple food price surges. 
• Absence of evidence showing that a measure taken in Switzerland could have 
a significant positive impact on the hunger situation in the world.  
• Supporters of the initiative did not manage to dissolve voters’ concerns about 
the Swiss commodity-trading sector.   
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Conclusions 
The idea of fighting hunger in the world brought by the initiative crafted by the Swiss 
Young Socialist Party should be remembered as altruistic and audacious. Altruistic 
because only people gifted with generosity and humanitarian consciousness can think 
beyond their own comfort and act in favor of those who are precariously endowed. 
Audacious because the path chosen to reach the ultimate goal was fraught with 
adversities and painful trade offs. The population did not approve the initiative but it 
kindled the debate, which is one of the pillars of our democratic society to reach 
solutions.  
 
Today the Swiss electorate does not believe that a less liberal system could address 
the world’s woes. As the survey results suggest, 20% (YYN) of voters voted against 
the initiative despite believing that speculation might cause food price surges. This 
result reflects the populations’ hesitations and doubts concerning the idea’s 
implementation and feasibility.  
 
Swiss voters considered that Switzerland had too much at stake. The risks of potential 
harms to the Swiss commodity-trading sector were taken very seriously. As the survey 
showed, 65.5% of surveyed voters demonstrated worry about lost jobs and lost 
revenue for the country. Therefore, we can say that the Swiss population is very aware 
of what puts bread on the table and thinks twice before biting the feeding hand. As a 
matter of fact, the results obtained by the survey showed that people who were worried 
about the Swiss commodity-trading sector tended to vote more often against the 
initiative. Had the commodity-trading sector not been as important for Switzerland, the 
Swiss electorate could have had a less biased decision-making process and the issue 
could have had a different outcome.  
 
There is still no consensus in the literature and in people’s perception about the real 
role of speculation in the surge of commodity prices. Therefore, having 58% of the 
electorate believing speculation was a bad thing was insufficient to have the initiative 
approved. Had the role of speculation been less ambiguous, had we gotten a definite 
prove that speculation was a bad thing, Swiss electorate could have voted in a 
different manner as well.    
 
Based on the assumptions taken throughout this work, it is likely that a lack of 
understanding of what is speculation and what it does to commodity prices has 
contributed to confuse voters in their decision-making process. Confused and not 
having the certainty about the efficiency of such decision, it is also likely that the Swiss 
electorate proceeded by weighing trade offs. Therefore, the risks incurred for one of 
the country’s most lucrative sectors being presented as imminent must have played 
the biggest role on voter’s decision-making process.   
 
In sum, because speculation is not proved to be the real culprit behind commodity 
prices surges, because a measure taken in Switzerland is not proved to have a 
significant impact internationally and because the risks associated to the adoption of 
the initiative were estimated as too important; the Swiss Young Socialist’s Initiative 
aiming at fighting hunger in the world by banning speculation on agricultural 
commodities was not accepted by the Swiss electorate.  
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Appendix 1: Initiative Text (original version in FR) 
I. La Constitution fédérale est modifiée comme suit: 
 
Art. 98a (nouveau) Lutte contre la spéculation sur les matières premières agricoles et 
les denrées alimentaires. 
 
1 La Confédération légifère sur la lutte contre la spéculation sur les matières 
premières agricoles et les denrées alimentaires. Ce faisant, elle respecte les principes 
suivants : 
 
a.  les banques, les négociants en valeurs mobilières, les assurances privées, les 
fonds de placements collectifs de capitaux et les personnes en leur sein chargées de 
la direction des affaires et de la gestion de fortune, les institutions d'assurances 
sociales, les autres investisseurs institutionnels et les gestionnaires de fortune 
indépendants ayant leur siège ou une succursale en Suisse ne peuvent investir ni pour 
eux-mêmes ni pour leur clientèle et ni directement ou indirectement dans des 
instruments financiers se rapportant à des matières premières agricoles et à des 
denrées alimentaires. Il en va de même pour la vente de produits structurés 
correspondants. 
 
b.  Les contrats conclus avec des producteurs et des commerçants de matières 
premières agricoles et de denrées alimentaires qui portent sur la garantie des délais 
ou des prix fixés pour livrer des quantités déterminées sont autorisés. 
 
2 La Confédération veille à une exécution efficace des prescriptions visées à l'al. 1. Ce 
faisant, elle respecte les principes suivants: 
 
a.  la surveillance, la poursuite pénale et le jugement relèvent de la compétence de la 
Confédération; 
 
b.  les entreprises fautives peuvent, indépendamment d'un éventuel manque 
d'organisation, être sanctionnées directement. 
 
3 La Confédération s'engage au niveau international en faveur d'une lutte efficace à 
l'échelle mondiale contre la spéculation sur les matières premières agricoles et les 
denrées alimentaires. 
 
II. Les dispositions transitoires de la Constitution fédérale sont modifiées comme suit: 
Art. 197, ch. 9 (nouveau) 
 
9. Disposition transitoire ad art. 98a (Lutte contre la spéculation sur les matières 
premières agricoles et les denrées alimentaires) 
Si les dispositions légales correspondantes n'entrent pas en vigueur dans les 
trois ans suivant l'acceptation de l'art. 98a par le peuple et les cantons, le 
Conseil fédéral édicte, en attendant leur entrée en vigueur, les dispositions 
d'exécution nécessaires par voie d'ordonnance. 
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Appendix 2: Initiative Text (original version DE) 
Die Eidgenössischen Volksinitiative “Keine Spekulation mit Nahrungsmitteln” will 
die Bundesverfassung mit folgendem Text ergänzen: 
 
I. Die Bundesverfassung wird wie folgt geändert: 
Art. 98a (neu) Bekämpfung der Spekulation mit Agrarrohstoffen und Nahrungsmitteln 
1 Der Bund erlässt Vorschriften zur Bekämpfung der Spekulation mit Agrarrohstoffen 
und Nahrungsmitteln. Dabei hält er sich an folgende Grundsätze: 
 
a.  Banken, Effektenhändler, Privatversicherungen, kollektive Kapitalanlagen und ihre 
mit der Geschäftsführung und Vermögensverwaltung befassten Personen, 
Einrichtungen der Sozialversicherung und andere institutionelle Anleger und 
unabhängige Vermögensverwalter mit Sitz oder Niederlassung in der Schweiz dürfen 
weder für sich noch für ihre Kundschaft und weder direkt noch indirekt in 
Finanzinstrumente investieren, die sich auf Agrarrohstoffe und Nahrungsmittel 
beziehen. Dasselbe gilt für den Verkauf entsprechender strukturierter Produkte. 
 
b.  Zulässig sind Verträge mit Produzenten und Händlern von Agrarrohstoffen und 
Nahrungsmitteln über die terminliche oder preisliche Absicherung bestimmter 
Liefermengen. 
 
2 Der Bund sorgt für einen wirksamen Vollzug der Vorschriften. Dabei beachtet er 
folgende Grundsätze: 
 
a.  Aufsicht-, sowie Strafverfolgung und -beurteilung sind Sache des Bundes. 
 
b.  Fehlbare Unternehmen können unabhängig von Organisationsmängeln direkt 
bestraft werden. 
 
3 Der Bund setzt sich auf internationaler Ebene dafür ein, dass die Spekulation mit 
Agrarrohstoffen und Nahrungsmitteln weltweit wirksam bekämpft wird. 
 
II Die Übergangsbestimmungen der Bundesverfassung werden wie folgt geändert: 
Art. 197 Ziff. 9 (neu) 
 
9. Übergangsbestimmung zu Art. 98a (Bekämpfung der Spekulation mit 
Agrarrohstoffen und Nahrungsmitteln) 
Treten innerhalb von drei Jahren nach Annahme von Artikel 98a durch Volk und 
Stände die entsprechenden gesetzlichen Bestimmungen nicht in Kraft, so erlässt der 
Bundesrat die nötigen Ausführungsbestimmungen auf dem Verordnungsweg; diese 
gelten bis zum Inkrafttreten der gesetzlichen Bestimmungen. 
  
Why did the Swiss Young Socialist’s initiative against speculation on agricultural products fail to be approved in 
Switzerland? How did the Swiss electorate reach a decision? 
Vitor Kinji MATSUURA  
44 
Appendix 3: List of parties and organizations 
supporting the initiative 
Swiss Parties:  
 
Les Socialistes, Les Verts, Parti du Travail, Indépendants de Gauche, Défense des 
Ainés, Parti Communiste Genevois, Action de Citoyen-ne-s et de Travailleurs-euses 
en Lutte (ACTE), Attac-Genève, Communauté Genevoise d’action Syndicale (CGAS), 
Les jeunes Vertes, Parti Evangélique Genève (PEV)  
 
Swiss Organizations  
 
Syndicat interpersonnel de travailleurs et travailleuses (SIT), Syndicat 
interprofessionnel (SYNA), UNIA, Alliance Agraire, BioSuisse, Biofarm, BIOFORUM, 
CETIM, Claro Fair Trade, COMUNDO, DEMETER, Le Pont avec le Sud, Eglises 
réformées Berne-Jura-Soleure, KleinBauern Vereinigung, OEME, reBREADing, 
Occupy Zurich, SGB/USS, SOLIDAR, SOLIFONDS, SOS TICINO, THE HUNGER 
PROJECT, UNITERRE, SWISSAID, Terre des hommes Schweiz, FIAN, AL Zurich.  
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Appendix 4: List of parties and organizations opposing 
the initiative 
Swiss Parties  
 
Les Libéraux-Radicaux (PLR), Mouvement Citoyens Genevois (MCG), Parit Chrétien 
Démocrate (PDC), UDC/SVP, Jeunes UDC, Les Verts Libéraux 
 
Swiss Organizations 
 
Chambre de Commerce Genève, Fédération des Entreprises Romande, Swiss 
Trading & Shipping Association (STSA) 
 
 
 
 
 
